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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
The concept of moratorium was summed up perfectly by Kloppers when he stated, “The 
moratorium or stay on proceedings is a cornerstone of all corporate rescue procedures.”1 
The above quotation illustrates the importance of the moratorium in any corporate rescue 
procedure. In South African corporate law, the moratorium is encompassed in section 133(1) of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008.2 The moratorium is one of the central pillars in ensuring the success 
of any business rescue regime, as it provides the essential breathing space for a company to 
reorganise its finances and find a possible solution to these difficulties.3 In Chetty v Hart,4 the 
court held that the purpose of placing a company under business rescue is to give it enough  
breathing space so that it can be restructured in a way that will allow it to return to a state of  being 
financially viable.5It is submitted that without the moratorium it would simply be impossible to 
rescue a financially distressed company.6 
Section 128(1)(b)(ii) of the 2008 Act fortifies this position by providing that a financially 
distressed company may be rescued by providing for, inter alia, a temporary moratorium.7 This 
statutory moratorium protects the company against claims of creditors which would distract the 
attention of the business rescue practitioner from rescuing the company.8 Therefore, the 
moratorium essentially allows the business rescue practitioner to focus their attention of achieving 
the purpose of business rescue, which is to formulate a business rescue plan that is designed to  
rescue a financially distressed company.9 The moratorium will be discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
                                                          
1 Kloppers “Judicial Management ─ A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of Reform?” 1999 Stell LR 417 429. 
2 Hereinafter referred to as the 2008 Act. 
3 Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner during business rescue” 2017 Merc LJ 419 421-422; FHI 
Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 879, Delport et al “Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 
2008” (LexisNexis) 2019 482(31); Bradstreet “The new business rescue: will creditors sink or swim?” 2011 SALJ 
352 372; see Kloppers (n 1) 430. 
4 (20323/14) [2015] ZASCA 112 (4 September 2015). 
5  Chetty (n 4) par 28. 
6  Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner during business rescue” (n 3) 422. 
7 See section 128(1)(b)(ii) of the 2008 Act. 
8 Bradstreet (n 3) 372; See also 178 Stamfordhill CC v Velvet Star Entertainment CC (1506/15) [2015] ZAKZDHC 
34 (1 April 2015) par 29. 
9 Cloete Murray NO v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank [2015] ZASCA 39 (26 March 2015) par 14, hereinafter 
referred to as Cloete Murray; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (2012) 879. 
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An interesting question arose in the case of Kythera Court v Le Rendez – Vous Café and Another10 
which asked, “what happens when a landlord cancels its lease agreement with a company after the 
commencement of business rescue proceedings? Is the company protected by the general 
moratorium?” The High Court had the opportunity to address this issue in the Kythera Court case. 
The court considered whether the general moratorium applies to eviction proceedings where the 
landlord cancels a lease agreement with a company in business rescue after the commencement of 
business rescue. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
In light of the above introduction, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the decision of 
Kythera Court and to determine whether the court has correctly interpreted the provisions of 
section 133(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, as they apply to eviction proceedings. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
This dissertation will be a case note. In this case note I will analyse the judgment of Kythera Court. 
I will also look at primary and secondary sources that have dealt with the interpretation of section 
133(1) of the Act in relation to the repossession of property by the owner. 
 
1.4 Chapter overview 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation introduced the topic and identified the problem statement. 
Chapter 2 will deal with South African corporate culture by evaluating specific provisions of 
Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act and discusses business rescue as a corporate rescue mechanism. The 
chapter also outlines the legal consequences of business rescue procedures. The chapter will then 
discuss the importance of the moratorium as comprised in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act. 
                                                          
10 2016 (6) SA 63 (GJ) (22 June 2016) (Hereinafter referred to as Kythera Court). 
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Chapter 3 will discuss the Kythera Court judgment and will consider the court’s interpretation of 
section 133(1) of the 2008 Act. 
Chapter 4 will discuss the relevant judicial decisions in relation to repossession proceedings and 
finally, chapter 5 contains the analysis of Kythera Court and conclusions of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: The South African Corporate Rescue Regime 
2.1 Brief discussion of Judicial Management 
The 2008 Act has introduced a new corporate rescue process which differs from the one provided 
for by its predecessor, the 1973 Companies Act.11 The old Act provided for a corporate rescue 
process known as ‘judicial management’.12 Judicial management was first introduced into South 
African law by the Companies Act 4 of 1926 and its intended objective was to rescue failing 
companies.13 Judicial management as a corporate rescue mechanism received a lot of academic 
criticism, mainly due to its low success rate and the fact that it was open to abuse.14 Despite its 
notable failures, judicial management  was retained under the then new Companies Act of 1973.15 
Under the 1973 Companies Act, judicial management was provided for under Chapter XV. One 
of the most prominent criticism levelled against judicial management was that it showed a definite 
bias towards protecting the rights of creditors and in the process, gave them a prominent role in 
the rescue process.16 This was problematic as it led to inequitable results and did not lead to the 
desired result of such a rescue mechanism. 
2.2 Business rescue 
Business rescue is provided for in Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act and is defined as the process aiding 
the rehabilitation of a financially distressed company by providing the temporary supervision of 
the company and the management of its affairs; a temporary moratorium on claims against the 
company or in respect of property in its possession; and the development and implementation of a 
business rescue plan.17 Business rescue is in line with section 7(k) of the 2008 Act which provides 
that one of the purposes of the Act is to: 
                                                          
11 61 of 1973. 
12 Meskin’s et al “Insolvency Law” (LexisNexis)2019 18.1. 
13 Loubser “Judicial management as a business rescue procedure in South African corporate law” Merc LJ 137 138. 
14 Loubser Some Comparative Aspect of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law (2010 LLD thesis) 3; See 
also Mongalo “An overview of company law reform in South Africa: From the guidelines to the Companies Act 
2008” 2010 Acta Juridica xiii xviii, Loubser (n 13) 139. 
15 Burdette “Some initials thoughts on the development of a modern and effective business rescue model for South 
Africa (part 1) 2004 Merc LJ 241 247. 
16 Loubser “The role of shareholders during corporate rescue proceedings: Always on the outside looking in?” 2008 
Merc LJ  372 373. 
17 See Section 128(1)(b) of the 2008 Act; see also Nwafor “Exploring the goals of business rescue through the lens of 
the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008” 2017 Stell LR 597 599. 
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‘“provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a 
manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders”’. 
The purpose of business rescue is to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is in financial 
distress.18 Business rescue provides for a mechanism which emphasises the rescue of financially 
viable companies rather than the demise of companies, through liquidation.19 Section 128(1)(b)(ii) 
of the 2008 Act provides that business rescue has two objectives. The first objective, is to devise 
and implement a rescue plan which will maximise the likelihood of the company to continue in 
existence on a solvent basis.20 This is in accordance with the general rule that, it is better to rescue 
a company rather than to liquidate it.21 
The second objective of business rescue is that if a rescue plan that will maximise the likelihood 
of the company to continue to exist on a solvent basis cannot be developed, then a plan, which 
would result in a better return for creditors or shareholders of the company than would result from 
the immediate liquidation of the company, must be developed and implemented.22 This secondary 
object results in the restructuring of the company by selling the assets or some parts of its business 
activities.23 The courts seem to have divergent views on whether section 128(1)(iii) contains two 
objectives or not. In Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies 
and Engineering Company Ltd, 24, Kgomo J recognised the second objective of business rescue 
where he stated that “[a]s the definition of…further demonstrates, business rescue is also a system 
that is aimed or geared at temporarily protecting a company against the claims of creditors so that 
its business can thereafter be disposed of (if concern could not be saved) for maximum value as a 
going concern in order to give creditors and shareholders a better return than they would have 
received had the company been liquated.”25  
                                                          
18 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 861; see also Rushworth “A critical analysis of the business 
rescue regime in the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 2010 Acta Juridica 375 375. 
19 Meskin’s (n 12) 18.1; See also Nwafor (n 17) 597. 
20 Rushworth (n 18) 375-376, see also Levenstein An Appraisal of the New South African Business Rescue 
Procedure (LLD thesis University of Pretoria 2015) 284. 
21 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 459. 
22 Davis, Cassim, Geach, Mongalo, Butler, Loubser, Coetzee & Burdette Companies and other Business Structures 
in South Africa (2nd ed) 237; See also Meskin’s (n 12) 18.1. 
23 Levenstein (n 20) 285; See also Cassim et al The Law of Business Structures (2012) 459. 
24 13/12406 10 May 2013 (GSJ). 
25 Merchant West Working Capital Solutions par 4. 
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In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd,26 , the court 
expressly stated that a company will be rescued in terms of business rescue if it achieves one of 
the two goals provided for in section 128(1)(b)(iii), viz to return the company to solvency or to 
develop and implement a plan which would result in a better return for creditors and shareholders 
than would result from the immediate liquidation of the company.27 This line of reasoning was 
adopted by Adams J in Carroll v Michael Carroll CC In Re: In the application for the Liquidation 
of: Michael Carroll CC (under supervision),28 where the learned judge held that “[o]nce the 
dividend sought to be achieved in terms of the business rescue plan was realised, the applicant 
would then be 'rescued' as envisaged by sections 128(1)(b)(iii) and (h) as a dividend better than 
that which would have been achieved in the case of a liquidation.” 
However, A G Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others,29 
the court had doubts about the existence of the secondary object and held that the creation of a 
secondary object will probably give rise to more litigation. In Griessel and Another v Lizemore 
and Others,30 the court in interpreting section 128(1)(b) only recognised the primary objective of 
business rescue and held that the secondary objective is a qualification of the first objective.31 The 
court also held that it would be in accordance with the purpose of business rescue to first establish 
whether the creditors would be willing to support the rehabilitation of the company, before 
considering paying creditors or shareholders a dividend in terms of the secondary objective.32 
2.3 Commencement of business rescue  
Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act provides that business rescue proceedings can be initiated in one of two 
ways.33 First, it can be initiated by a resolution adopted by the board of directors of the company 
and secondly, it can be initiated by an order of court.34 
                                                          
26 [2013] 3 All SA 303 (SCA). 
27Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd Par 26; See also FirstRand Bank Ltd v KJ Foods CC (In business 
rescue) [2017] 3 All SA 1 (SCA) par 68. 
28 (2018/22808) [2019] ZAGPPHC 74 (15 March 2019) par 28. 
29 2012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ) (6 February 2012). 
30 [2015] 4 All SA 433 (GJ). 
31 Griessel and Another v Lizemore par 80. 
32 Griessel and Another v Lizemore par 81. 
33 Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law (2012) 277; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 865; See 
also Panamo Properties v Nel 2015 (5) SA 63 (SCA) par 8. 
34 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 865-866. 
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In order to warrant the commencement of business rescue, the company must be in financial 
distress and there must be a reasonable prospect of rescuing it.35 A company is financially 
distressed if it appears to be reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its 
debts as they become due and payable within the immediately ensuing six months or if it appears 
to be reasonably likely that the company will be become insolvent within the immediately ensuing 
six months.36 It is submitted that since a cash flow and a balance sheet test can be applied to 
determine whether a company is financially distressed, it is clear that the business rescue procedure 
is intended to be used at the earliest possible moment.37 This means that the company is not yet 
insolvent  but it is on the verge of being insolvent.38  
2.3.1 By resolution of the board 
The board of directors of the company may resolve to commence business rescue proceedings and 
place the company under supervision, if the board has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
company is financially distressed39 and there appears to be a reasonable prospect that the company 
can be rescued.40 The company must, within five days after filing the resolution to begin business 
rescue41, publicise, in the prescribed manner, a notice of the resolution and its effective date to 
every affected person.42 Within that same five days after filing the resolution, the company must 
appoint a business rescue practitioner who in turn must have consented to being appointed.43 The 
company must, within two days after the appointment of the business rescue practitioner, file a 
notice of appointment of the business rescue practitioner and must, within five days after the filing 
of the notice of appointment, publish a copy of the notice to each affected persons.44 If the company 
fails to comply with these requirements, then the resolution adopted to commence business rescue 
                                                          
35 Loubser “The business rescue proceedings in the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Some concerns and questions (part 
1) 2010 TSAR 501 502. 
36See section 128(1)(f) of the 2008 Act. 
37 Delport et al “Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (n 3) 452. 
38 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 864. 
39 See the discussion in par 2.3 above. 
40 Section 129 of the 2008 Act. It is submitted that by “rescuing” the company is meant achieving the goals of 
business rescue, as discussed above. 
41 However, the Companies Commission may allow for a longer time. 
42 Section 129(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. The notice must be accompanied by or must include a sworn statement of the 
facts relevant to the grounds on which the board resolution was founded. 
43 Section 129(3)(b) of the 2008 Act. 
44 Sections 129(4)(a) and (b) of the 2008 Act. 
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proceedings lapses and becomes a nullity.45 In terms of the Act, any affected person may, at any 
time after the adoption of the resolution of the board but before the adoption of the business rescue 
plan, apply to court for an order setting aside the business rescue resolution.46 The affected person 
can also apply to court to set aside the appointment of the business rescue practitioner.47 
2.3.2 By court order 
Section 131(1) of the Act allows an affected person to apply to court for an order placing the 
company under supervision and commencing business rescue proceedings. The applicant must 
serve a copy of the application to the company and to the Companies Commission and each 
affected person must be notified about the application.48 An affected person is entitled to 
participate in the hearing of the application49 without the necessity of applying to court for leave 
to intervene in the proceedings.50 
In terms of section 131(4)(a), the court may make an order placing the company under supervision 
and commencing business rescue proceedings, if the court is satisfied that: the company is 
financially distressed, the company has failed to pay any amount due in terms of an obligation 
arising from a public regulation or in terms of a contract relating to employment matters. The court 
will also grant an order to place the company under business rescue, if it is satisfied that it is just 
and equitable to do so for financial reasons, provided that there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing 
the company. If the court dismisses the application to place the company under business rescue, it 
is entitled to make any other appropriate order, including an order placing the company under 
liquidation.51 If the court grants an order commencing business rescue, the court may also make 
an order appointing an interim practitioner nominated by an affected person.52 
                                                          
45 Section 129(5); See also Panamo Properties v Nel (n 33) par 29; Advanced Technologies and Engineering 
Company (Pty) Ltd (in Business Rescue) v Aeronautique et Technologies 72522/2011 6 June 2012 (GNP) par 27; 
Madodza (Pty) Ltd (In business rescue) v ABSA Bank Ltd 38906/2012 15 August 2012 (GNP) par 24 where the court 
quoted with approval the case of Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd (in Business 
Rescue) v Aeronautique et Technologies. 
46 Section 130(1)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
47 Section 130(1)(b) of the 2008 Act. 
48 Section 131(2)(a) -(b) of the 2008 Act. 
49 Section 131(3) of the 2008 Act. 
50 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 873. 
51 Section 131(4)(b) of the 2008 Act. 
52 Section 131(5) of the 2008 Act. 
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If the application for an order to commence business rescue is made after the commencement of 
liquidation proceedings by or against the company, the application has the effect of suspending 
the liquidation proceedings until the court has adjudicated upon the application or, if the court 
grants the order to commence business rescue proceedings, when the business rescue proceedings 
have ended.53 This means that in terms of the section, a business rescue application  may be brought 
even if the liquidation proceedings against the company have commenced.54 
2.4 Duration of business rescue proceedings 
In the case of business rescue proceedings initiated by the resolution of the board under section 
129, the business rescue proceedings commence when the company files the resolution to place 
itself under supervision or when the company applies to court, requesting the court’s permission 
to file another resolution in terms of section 129(5)(b).55 In the case of business rescue proceedings 
initiated by a court order under section 131, the business rescue proceedings commence when an 
affected person applies to court.56 Business rescue proceedings also commence when the court, 
during the course of liquidation proceedings or proceedings to enforce a security interest, makes 
an order placing the company under supervision.57 
2.5 Termination of Business rescue proceedings 
In terms of the Act, business rescue proceedings can be terminated in three ways. Firstly, when 
the court sets aside the resolution or order that commenced those proceedings, or the court converts 
the business rescue proceedings into liquidation proceedings.58 Secondly, where the business 
rescue practitioner has filed a notice with the Commission terminating the business rescue 
proceedings.59 Lastly, when the business rescue plan, that has been proposed by the practitioner, 
is rejected and there has been no attempt by any of the affected persons to extend the proceedings 
and the practitioner has since filed a notice of substantial implementation of that plan.60 
                                                          
53 Section 131(6)(a) -(b) of the 2008 Act. 
54 See Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law (n 33) 279; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 874 and 
Meskin’s (n 12) 18.5.1. 
55 Section 132(1)(a) &(b) of the 2008 Act; Meskin’s (n 12) 18.5.1; Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 
876. 
56 Section 132(1)(c) of the 2008 Act. 
57 Section 132(1)(d) of the 2008 Act. 
58 Section 132(2)(a)(i) -(ii) of the 2008 Act. 
59 Section 132(b) of the 2008 Act. 
60 Section 132(c)(i) -(ii) of the 2008 Act. 
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It is evident that the rules on business rescue are comprehensive and concise. They provide for all 
matters including the commencement, duration and termination of such proceedings. The rules as 
outlined by the 2008 Act must be followed step by step. 
2.6 The legal consequences of the commencement of business rescue proceedings 
2.6.1 Moratorium  
One of the most important consequences of the commencement of business rescue proceedings is 
that there is an automatic stay of legal proceedings against the company.61 Section 133(1) of the 
2008 Act provides for a moratorium against the commencement or continuation of legal 
proceedings and enforcement actions against the company or any of its property or any property 
within its lawful possession, subject to certain exceptions.62 The moratorium granted by section 
133(1) of the new Act is designed provide the company with a breathing space while the business 
rescue practitioner attempts to rescue the company.63  
The moratorium is one of the central pillars in ensuring the success of any business rescue regime, 
as it provides the essential breathing space for a company to reorganise its finances and find a 
possible solution to these difficulties.64 Levenstein states that the moratorium is an important 
aspect of any successful corporate rescue mechanism used in the restructuring of a company that 
is financially distressed.65 Therefore, without the moratorium, it would be difficult to rescue a 
company. The moratorium applies to all creditors of the company, irrespective of whether they are 
                                                          
61 Davis, Cassim, Geach, Mongalo, Butler, Loubser, Coetzee & Burdette (n 22) 248; Sharrock et al Hockly’s 
Insolvency Law (n 33) 280; Bradstreet, Pretorious & Mindlin “The Wolf in sheep’s clothing- when debtor friendly is 
creditor-friendly: South Africa’s business rescue and alternatives learned from the United States’ chapter 11” 2015 
JCCL&P 1 2. 
62 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 878; Marumoagae “The law relating to executory contracts in South 
Africa during business-rescue proceedings” 2017 JCCL&P 31 35; DH brother Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and 
others 2014 (1) SA 103 (KZP) par 26; Chetty v Hart (20323/14) [2015] ZASCA 112 (4 September 2015) par 3; 
Kythera Court (n 10) par 5; Madodza (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd and others (38906/2012) [2012] ZAGPPHC 165 (15 
August 2012) par 3, Rushworth (n 18) 383; Marias and others v Shiva Uranium (Pty) Ltd (In Business Rescue) and 
others [2019] 5 BLLR 472 (LC) (5 October 2018) par 7. 
63 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 879; Cloete Murray (n 9) par 14; Southern Value Consortium v 
Tresso Trading 102 (Pty)Ltd and Another 2016 (6) SA 501 (WCC) (23 November 2015) par 34; Kythera court (n 10) 
para 7, Rushworth (n 18) 383; Levenstein (n 20) 377. 
64 Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner during business rescue” (n 3) 421-422; Cassim et al 
Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 879, Delport et al “Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (n 3) 
482(31); Bradstreet (n 3) 372; See also Kloppers (n 1) 430. 
65  Levenstein (n 20) 377; See also Bradstreet (n 3) 372. 
16 
 
secured or unsecured creditors.66 If the creditors of the company are allowed to enforce their rights  
during the business rescue proceedings, the business rescue practitioner’s efforts of rescuing the 
company will be doomed to failure.67 The moratorium applies for the duration of the business 
rescue proceedings.68 It is important, for the purpose of this dissertation, to note that the 
moratorium also prohibits legal proceedings and enforcement actions in relation to property 
belonging to the company or that which is in the lawful possession of the company.69 
The moratorium, in relation to property belonging to the company or which is in the lawful 
possession of the company, prevents property owners from recovering their properties from a 
company under business rescue, due to the fact that such property may be vital to the rescuing of 
the company.70 The moratorium, for the duration of the business rescue process, suspends the 
rights of property owners to bring legal proceedings and enforcement actions to recover their 
property from the company in order to allow the business rescue practitioner to focus their attention 
on achieving the purpose of business rescue, which is to formulate a business rescue plan that is 
designed to  rescue a financially distressed company.71  
The inclusion of the exceptions, under which legal proceedings may be instituted or continued, 
suggests that the moratorium is not absolute.72 Section 133(1) provides for exceptions when legal 
proceedings or enforcement actions may be commenced or continued against the company.73 
These include, inter alia, that legal proceedings or enforcement actions against the company may 
be initiated or continued with the written consent of the business rescue practitioner or with the 
leave of the court.74 
 
                                                          
66  Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 879; Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner 
during business rescue” (n 3) 422. 
67 Burdette “Some initial thoughts on the development of a modern and effective business rescue model for South 
Africa (part 2) 2004 Merc LJ 409 419. 
68 Delport et al “Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (n 3) 481; Cassim et al Contemporary Company 
Law (n 3) 878. 
69 See Meskin’s (n 12) 18.1. 
70 Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner during business rescue” (n 3) 433. 
71 See the discussion in chapter 1. 
72 Loubser “The business rescue proceedings in the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Some concerns and questions (part 2) 
2010 TSAR 689. 
73 See also Rushworth (n 18) 383; Meskin’s (n 12) 18.6. 
74 Section 133(1)(a) -(b) of the 2008 Act; Meskin’s (n 12) 18.6. 
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2.6.2 Moratorium on property interests 
The 2008 Act, further, provides for a moratorium on property interests. Section 134(1)(c) of the 
2008 Act provides that during business rescue, despite any provision to the contrary, no person is 
entitled to exercise any right in respect of any property in the lawful possession of the company 
unless the practitioner consents in writing.75 The section applies irrespective of whether the 
property is owned by the company and it prohibits/suspends the exercise of rights by property 
owners in respect of property in the lawful possession of a company under business rescue.76 It is 
submitted that the moratorium in section 134(1)(c) supplements the moratorium found in section 
133(1).77 The two sections refer to “lawful possession” of property in the possession of the 
company. In Kythera Court, the court remarked that these sections are casted in similar terms as 
they both refer to “lawful possession” of property in the possession of the company.78 
2.6.3 Effect of business rescue on contracts 
During business rescue proceedings, the business rescue practitioner is granted power to suspend, 
entirely, partially or conditionally, any agreement to which the company was a party at the 
commencement of business rescue proceedings, except for a contract of employment.79 This 
subsection, according to Delport, allows the company, through the powers granted to the business 
rescue practitioner, to free itself from burdensome contractual provisions that may prevent it from  
being rescued.80 In cases where the practitioner decides to suspend a contract, the other party to 
the contract will be entitled to claim damages.81 Alternatively, the practitioner may approach the 
court for the cancellation of any obligation of the company, on terms that are just and reasonable 
in the circumstances.82 If the practitioner suspends the contract in accordance with the section, 
then the suspension will have the effect that non-compliance with an obligation by the company 
                                                          
75 See section 134(1)(c) of the 2008 Act. 
76 Nwafor “Moratorium in business rescue scheme and the protection of company’s creditors” 2017 Corporate 
Board: role, duties and composition 59 62 available at http://doi.org/10.22495/cbv13i1p6 (accessed 12 August 
2019).   
77Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law (n 33) 281; Nwafor (n 77) 64. 
78 Kythera Court par 10-11. Lawful possession is discussed in Chapter 4 at par 4.2 below. 
79 Section 136(2) of the 2008 Act. 
80 Delport et al “Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (n 3) 482(51). 
81Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law (n 3) 886. 
82 Section 136(2)(b) of the 2008 Act. 
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will not lead to the cancellation of the agreement, because the company will not be in breach of 
the contract.83 
The business rescue practitioner is only entitled to suspend the contract in respect of contractual 
obligations which would become due during the business rescue proceedings.84 This means that 
the business rescue practitioner is only entitled to suspend obligations of the company which would 
only become due after the commencement of  business rescue, and not those which became due 
before the commencement of  business rescue.85 It is submitted that the practitioner’s power to 
suspend a contract does not prevent a creditor from cancelling a contract, if there was a breach of 
that contract prior to the commencement of business rescue proceedings.86 In 178 Stamfordhill CC 
v Velvet Star Entertainment CC87 the court reiterated this position and held that the rental amounts 
due after the business rescue proceedings have commenced could not be claimed, but that rental 
amounts that were due before the commencement of business rescue proceedings could be 
claimed.88 The court further held that the landlord was entitled to cancel the contract, as the 
company had failed to honour its obligations in terms of the contract prior to the commencement 
of the business rescue proceedings.89 
2.6.4 Cancellation of a contract with a company in business rescue 
It is trite law that the general moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act does prevent a creditor 
from cancelling an agreement with a company in business rescue and the creditor may cancel the 
agreement without the permission of the court or the business rescue practitioner in terms of 
section 133(1)(a) -(b) of the 2008 Act.90 
In the case of Cloete Murray,91 the court had to decide whether a creditor of a company under 
business rescue, after the commencement of business rescue, was entitled to cancel an agreement 
                                                          
83 Delport et al “Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (n 3) 482(51); See also Cassim “The effect of the 
moratorium on property owner during business rescue” (n 3) 427. 
84Cassim et al The Law of Business Structures (n 23) 476, Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner 
during business rescue” (n 3) 427. 
85 Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner during business rescue” (n 3) 427. 
86 Delport et al “Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (n 3) 482(51) 
87 (1506/15) [2015] ZAKZDHC 34 (1 April 2015). 
88 178 Stamfordhill CC (n 105) par 25. 
89 178 Stamfordhill CC (n 105) par 27. 
90 Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner during business rescue” (n 3) 423-424; See also Delport 
et al “Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (n 3) 482(37). 
91 Cloete Murray (n 9). 
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it had with the company, prior to the company being placed under business rescue.92 The 
respondent concluded a Master Instalment Sale Agreement with Skyline Crane Hire (Pty) Ltd, in 
terms of which the respondent sold and delivered movable goods to Skyline and the respondent 
retained ownership of the goods until the respondent had paid the full purchase price.93 Skyline 
was subsequently placed under business rescue and at the time, the company had already fallen 
into arrears with its monthly installments payable to Wesbank in terms of the agreement.94 
Wesbank sent a letter to skyline , cancelling the agreement due to Skyline’s failure to pay the 
monthly instalments which were due in terms of the agreement.95 The applicant argued that the 
respondent’s cancellation of the agreement amounted to ‘enforcement action’ and as such, the 
cancellation was barred by section 133 of the 2008 Act.96 
The court acknowledged that section 133 of the Act provides for a moratorium against legal 
proceedings including enforcement action. However, the court took cognisance of the fact that the 
Act does not contain a definition of “legal proceedings” or “enforcement action” and held that the 
term “legal proceedings” usually means lawsuit and as such, cancellation of an agreement does 
not constitute legal proceedings.97 The court further held that the inclusion of the  “enforcement 
action “ under the generic phrase “legal proceedings” indicates that enforcement action is 
considered as a species of legal proceedings.98 According to the court, this is intensified by the fact 
that section 133(1) provides that no legal proceedings, including enforcement action, may be 
commenced or proceeded with in “any forum”. Therefore, since “forum” usually refers to a court 
or a tribunal, enforcement actions relates to formal proceedings ancillary to legal proceedings, 
such as the enforcement or execution of court orders by means of writs of executions or 
attachments.99 Lastly, the court held that the terms “enforcement” and “cancellation” are mutually 
exclusive. The court held that cancellation is a unilateral act of a party to an agreement and it does 
                                                          
92 Cloete Murray par 1. 
93 Cloete Murray par 2. 
94 Cloete Murray Par 3. 
95 Cloete Murray Par 4. 
96 Cloete Murray Par 28. 
97 Cloete Murray Par 31. 
98 Cloete Murray Par 32. 
99 Cloete Murray Par 32. 
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not occur in any form of forum. Therefore, the interpretation of enforcement action does not 
include cancellation.100 
The decision in Cloete Murray was followed with approval in Finlayson NO v Master Movers 
Cape CC,101 where the court held that, the fact that a company is under business rescue does not 
have any effect on the creditor’s right to cancel the agreement.102 The court held that the general 
moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act does not does not apply to the cancellation of an 
agreement and, consequently, a creditor does not require the consent of the business rescue or the 
court to cancel an agreement.103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
100 Cloete Murray Par 33. 
1012016 JDR 1451 (WCC).  
102 Finlayson NO Par 41. 
103 Finlayson NO par 41.  
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Chapter 3: Kythera Court Judgment 
3.1 Facts of the case 
The applicant, a partnership trading as a property rental firm, brought an application in which it 
sought an order evicting the first respondent, a close corporation, from its premises.104 The 
background of this application was premised on a lease agreement concluded between the 
applicant and the first respondent. The lease agreement was concluded for a period of six years, 
commencing from the 1st of May 2010 to the 30th of April 2016.105 
The applicant served two notices to the first respondent informing it that it was in breach of the 
lease agreement due to non-payment of the rental amounts and municipal utilities.106 Thereafter, 
the first respondent was placed in business rescue and the second respondent was appointed as the 
business rescue practitioner.107 On the 7th of March 2016, nearly three months after the first 
respondent was placed in business rescue, the applicant cancelled the lease agreement and 
requested the first respondent to vacate the premises within seven days, but the first respondent 
refused to vacate the premises.108 
At the first creditor’s meeting, the second respondent acknowledged the existence of the lease 
agreement between the applicant and the first respondent and gave the applicant written 
confirmation that the rental amounts would be paid. However, the second responded failed to carry 
out this commitment.109 The applicant approached the court seeking an order to evict the first 
respondent from the premises, on the ground that the lease agreement had been cancelled. At the 
time this application was heard, the second respondent had failed to file a business rescue plan as 
required by the 2008 Act.110 
                                                          
104 Kythera Court par 1-2. 
105 Kythera Court par 3. 
106 Kythera Court par 28. 
107 Kythera Court par 29. 
108 Kythera Court par 30 & par 3. 
109 Kythera Court par 3. 
110 Kythera Court Par 3. 
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The first respondent opposed the application on the ground that the general moratorium provided 
for in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act, prevents the applicant from cancelling the lease agreement 
and bringing the eviction proceedings.111 
3.2 Judgment 
The court in casu reiterated the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Cloete Murray that an 
agreement can be cancelled during business rescue proceedings as the act of cancellation does not 
constitute enforcement action in terms of section 133(1) of the new Act. 
The High Court, in handing down its judgment, stated that vindicatory proceedings or proceedings 
for the repossession of property in the unlawful possession of the company in business rescue 
would be permissible.112 The court also referred to section 133(1) of the Act in particular, the 
phrase “in relation to any property belonging to the company, or lawfully in its possession” and 
held that the phrase renders the moratorium inapplicable to legal proceedings or enforcement 
action in relation to property that is in the unlawful possession of the company in business 
rescue.113 The court held that when a lease has been terminated it is the  duty of the lessee to vacate 
the property and that the lessee’s failure to vacate the property when it is obligated to do so, renders 
the lessee an unlawful occupier.114 The High Court concluded that the general moratorium granted 
by section 133(1) of the Act does not protect the  company against legal proceedings for ejectment 
where a lease has been validly cancelled and the company in business rescue is an unlawful 
occupier as a as a result of failing to vacate the property when obligated to do so. The court held 
that in such circumstances, the landlord will be able to bring eviction proceedings against a 
company in business rescue without obtaining the leave of the court as required by section 
133(1)(b) of the Act.115 
The court also referred to section 134(1)(c) of the 2008 Act which deals with property interests. It 
was held that this section is crafted in similar terms with section 133(1) of the 2008 Act.116 The 
court held that this section supports the proposition that the moratorium does not find application 
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112 Kythera Court par 9. 
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114 Kythera Court par 14. 
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in respect of property in the unlawful possession of the company and that to apply the general 
moratorium to all proceedings, including those brought by property owners who seek to protect 
their properties would be a drastic interference with their right of ownership in terms of the 
common law.117 Further, the court went on to state that “[i]t could not have been the intention of 
the legislature to frustrate the rights of property owner and to render them remediless during 
business rescue proceedings”.118 
Additionally, the court also referred to section 136(2)(a) of the 2008 Act. This section grants the 
business rescue practitioner the power to suspend any obligations of the company, arising from an 
agreement to which the company was a party to before the commencement of the business rescue 
proceedings.119 The court stated that had the business rescue practitioner invoked this section, the 
landlord would have been prevented from cancelling the lease agreement.120 
Now that the facts of the case have been discussed, it is necessary to provide an analysis of the 
judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
117 Kythera Court par 12. 
118 Kythera Court par 12. 
119 Kythera Court par 15. 
120 Kythera Court par 15. 
24 
 
Chapter 4: Moratorium and cancellation of a contract by a property owner 
4.1 Judicial Precedent 
The crux of the issue is whether the company is protected by the moratorium in section 133 of the 
2008 Act, in circumstances where the owner of the property cancels its contract with the company 
under business rescue. 
In Madodza (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd,121 before the commencement of business rescue 
proceedings, the respondent cancelled the finance agreements it had with the applicant in respect 
of motor vehicles, due to the applicant’s failure to pay the monthly rentals in terms of the 
agreement. The respondent went on and obtained court orders for the return of the motor vehicles 
which were in the applicant’s possession.122 after the applicant was placed under business rescue, 
the sheriff sought to remove the vehicles from the applicant’s place of business and the applicant 
argued that it was entitled to remain in possession of the vehicles as section 133 prohibits 
enforcement actions during business rescue proceedings.123 The court held that section 133 
requires that the assets must either be the property or in the lawful possession of the company. The 
court held it was common cause that the vehicles were not the property of the applicant. The court 
held that since the agreements were cancelled and the fact that the respondent had sought to remove 
the vehicles from the applicant’s possession, the applicant was not in lawful possession of the 
vehicles and therefore, had failed to meet the requirements of section 133.124 
In Southern Value Consortium v Tresso Trading 102,125 the applicant and the respondent had 
concluded a lease agreement. The respondent fell into arrears with its monthly rental payments, 
operating costs and other charges. The applicant reserved its right to cancel the agreement.126 The 
applicant then sought an order ejecting the respondent from the property and demanded payment. 
127 Thereafter, the respondent was placed in business rescue and the business rescue practitioners 
opposed the ejectment action on behalf of the responded. The business rescue practitioners 
contended that the applicant was precluded by section 133(1) and section 134(1)(c) of the 2008 
                                                          
121 (38906/2012) [2012] ZAGPPHC 165 (15 August 2012) Hereinafter referred to as Madodza. 
122 Madodza Par 7. 
123 Madodza Par 6 and 11. 
124 Madodza Par 17. 
125 2016 (6) SA 501 (WCC) (23 November 2015) Hereinafter referred to as Southern Value Consortium. 
126 Southern Value Consortium Par 6 – 7. 
127 Southern Value Consortium Par 9. 
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Act from seeking to eject the respondent from the leased property.128 The court held that since the 
lease agreement was cancelled, the respondent was no longer in lawful possession of the leased 
property. For this reason, the court held that the applicant is not precluded by section 133(1) and 
section 134(1)(c) from seeking to assert its right of ownership in the leased property.129 The court 
further held that it would not have been the intention of the legislature that a company in business 
rescue would restructure its affairs by making use of assets to which it has no lawful claim.130 
In JVJ Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd,131 the applicant, a transporting 
company, concluded an instalment sale agreement with the first respondent. In terms of the 
agreement, the applicant acquired possession of a vehicle and the first respondent retained 
ownership of the vehicle.132 The applicant then fell into arrears with its instalments, with the 
resulting effect that the first respondent cancelled the agreement and sought the return of the 
vehicle. The applicant thereafter was placed under business rescue.133 The vehicle was vital in the 
successful rescuing of the company. The applicant sought an interdict restraining the 
implementation of the warranty under which the first respondent would be able to seize the vehicle, 
and have it returned to it.134 The court held that a purchaser under an instalment agreement 
reserving ownership to the seller becomes a lawful possessor when put in possession of the 
property in terms of the agreement, and becomes an unlawful possessor if the agreement is 
cancelled.135 The court held that the applicant’s possession of the vehicle was unlawful, as the 
agreement was canceled by the first respondent.136 The court held that section 133(1) does not 
prevent the recovery of property possessed by the company unlawfully and as such, the court 
refused the interdict.137  
The common denominator in most of these cases is that the courts focused on whether the 
company, under business rescue, was in lawful possession of the property or not. It then becomes 
                                                          
128 Southern Value Consortium Par 14. 
129 Southern Value Consortium Par 31-36. 
130 Southern Value Consortium Par 35. 
131 2016(6) SA 448 (KZD) (22 July 2016). Hereinafter referred to as JVJ Logistics. 
132 JVJ Logistics par 2. 
133 JVJ Logistics par 2. 
134JVJ Logistics par 4. 
135 JVJ Logistics par 25. 
136JVJ Logistics par 31. 
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prudent to discuss the phrase “lawfully in its possession” as it appears in the moratorium provisions 
in the 2008 Act. 
4.2 Lawful possession 
In order for a company to be protected by the moratorium in sections 133(1) and 134(1)(c) of the 
2008 Act, the company must be in lawful possession of the property.138 In JVJ logistics, the court 
held that two meanings can ascribed to the phrase “lawfully”. There is lawful possession in the 
civil sense and lawful possession in the criminal sense.139 Lawful possession in the civil sense, 
entails a situation in terms of which a purchaser under an instalment agreement reserving 
ownership to the seller becomes a lawful possessor when put in possession of the property in terms 
of the agreement, and becomes an unlawful possessor if the agreement is cancelled.140 Lawful 
possession in the criminal sense is where the company acquires possession of the property 
unlawfully, such as when the company acquires possession of the property by fraudulent means or 
through theft.141 The court held that the moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act will only 
protect possession which is lawful in the civil sense.142 This line of reasoning has been followed 
in subsequent cases, such as Kythera Court. 
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140 See par 4.1 on the discussion on JVJ Logistics. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis and Conclusions 
5.1 Analysis 
The moratorium, for the duration of the business rescue process, suspends the rights of property 
owners to bring legal proceedings and enforcement actions to recover their property from the 
company in order to allow the business rescue practitioner to focus their attention on achieving the 
purpose of business rescue, which is to formulate a business rescue plan that is designed to  rescue 
a financially distressed company.143 A question which subsequently flows from judgments such as 
Kythera Court is, how can the business rescue practitioner be expected to restructure the affairs of 
the company in a way that will allow it to return to a state of  being financially viable if property 
owners are be allowed to repossess their properties which are crucial to the rescue endeavor.  
The court in Kythera Court should have noted that the moratorium is essential in achieving the 
goals of business rescue and that it would be highly impossible for the first respondent to return to 
a state of being financially viable without having the premises at its disposal. The importance of 
the moratorium is clearly carved in section 128(1)(b)(ii) of the 2008 Act, which provides that a 
financially distressed company may be rescued by providing for, inter alia, a temporary 
moratorium. 
The court in Kythera Court correctly stated that the moratorium is not an absolute bar to legal 
proceedings being commenced or continued against a company under business rescue.144 Section 
133(1)(1)(a)-(b) of the 2008 Act provides that that legal proceedings or enforcement actions 
against the company may be initiated or continued with the written consent of the business rescue 
practitioner or with the leave of the court.145 Therefore, the court’s finding that leave to institute 
eviction proceedings against the respondent was unnecessary is, with respect, flawed. 
The court in Kythera Court noted that the business rescue practitioner did not invoke the provisions 
of section 136(2)(a) of the 2008 Act, and held that had he done so, the applicant may have been 
prevented from cancelling the lease agreement.146 Applying the business rescue practitioner’s 
power to suspend a contract to Kythera Court’s case, it is clear that the business rescue practitioner 
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145 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
146 Kythera Court par 31. 
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would not have been able suspend the contract due to the fact that the obligation to pay rent became 
due before the commencement of the business rescue. As discussed above, the business rescue 
practitioner is only entitled to suspend obligations which would only become due after the 
commencement of business rescue. The landlord would still have been entitled to cancel the 
agreement, notwithstanding the suspension of the agreement by the business rescue practitioner, 
as per 178 Stamfordhill CC.147 The court in Kythera Court seems to have made an error in its 
analysis of the provisions of section 136(2)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
The court in Kythera Court concluded that the applicant had a right to cancel the lease agreement 
and to evict the tenant.148 In reaching its conclusion, the court in Kythera Court followed the 
position as stated in Cloete Murray. Cassim,149 whilst he agrees with the position that the 
moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act does not prevent a creditor from cancelling an 
agreement with a company under business rescue, argues that a mere cancellation of the agreement 
by a landlord has no effect on the tenant company’s continued use of the leased property.150 The 
cancellation of the lease agreement does not automatically entitle the property owner to repossess 
the leased property from the company.151 If, upon cancellation of the agreement, a landlord 
becomes entitled to repossess the leased premises from the tenant company, then the purpose of 
the moratorium, which is to give the business rescue practitioner crucial breathing space to rescue 
the company, would be defeated.152 This argument by the learned author makes it evident that the 
High Court, in Kythera Court, misapplied the general moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 
Act, by finding that a mere cancellation by the applicant entitled it to automatically repossess the 
leased premises from the tenant company under business rescue. 
The court should have taken cognisance of the fact that the premises, from which the respondent 
conducts its business, are vital to the business rescue process. The court should have found that 
the applicant is allowed to cancel the lease agreement, however, it could not repossess its property 
for the duration of the business rescue process, as the property is essential if the company is to be 
restructured in a way that will allow it to return to a state of being financially viable. In order for 
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150 Ibid. 
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a company to return to a state of being financially viable, the company has to continue conducting 
business and how can the first respondent, a restaurant, be expected to continue operating if it is 
deprived of the premises from which it conducts its business. 
As already discussed in chapter 4 that, for the moratorium to protect a company in business rescue, 
the company must be in lawful possession of the property. As already alluded to above, the court 
in JVJ Logistics held that the moratorium will only protect possession which is lawful in the civil 
sense.153 This line of reasoning has been followed in subsequent cases, such as Kythera Court. 
This approach has been criticised mainly because it disregards the purpose of the moratorium. 
Many authors, like Cassim, have criticised the approach that the general moratoriums in section 
133(1) and section 134(1)(c) of the 2008 Act will only protect possession which is lawful in the 
civil sense. The learned author argues that, if the moratorium will only protect possession in which 
is lawful in the civil sense, then the implications would be that the landlord, by a mere cancellation 
of the lease agreement, can circumvent the moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act and be 
entitled to repossess the property which is in the possession of the company in business rescue.154  
If the landlord is entitled to repossess property which is crucial to the rescue process, then the 
purpose of the moratorium would be undermined, and it would be impossible to rescue the 
company in business rescue. The purpose of the general moratorium, as discussed in paragraph 
2.6.1 above, is to provide the company with a breathing space while the business rescue 
practitioner attempts to rescue the company. The moratorium prevents the landlord from 
repossessing property which is in possession of the company in business rescue, even if the 
landlord has cancelled the lease agreement.155It is submitted that, in order to give effect to the 
purpose of the moratorium and the objects of business rescue, the phrase “lawful possession” as it 
appears in section 133(1) of the 2008, ought to be interpreted to denote lawful possession in the 
criminal sense, so as to preclude from the protection of the moratorium property possessed by the 
company as a result of fraud or theft.156 The effect of this, according to Cassim, would be that if 
the company obtained possession of the property in terms of a valid agreement, the property must 
be regarded as lawfully possessed by the company and would be protected by the moratorium in 
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section 133(1) of the 2008 Act.157 Thus, the landlord would not be a able circumvent the 
moratorium, simply by cancelling the agreement and claiming repossession of the leased property. 
The court in Kythera Court held that the phrase “in relation to any property belonging to the 
company, or lawfully in its possession”, in its plain meaning, seems to limit the reach of the 
moratorium and renders it inapplicable to legal proceedings or enforcement action in relation to 
property that is not lawfully possessed by the company under business rescue.158 The court further 
held that the moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act does not include legal proceedings for 
the ejectment of a company in business rescue where the lease agreement has been validly 
cancelled and the company is an unlawful occupier, and leave to bring ejectment proceedings is 
unnecessary.159  
Lawrenson160states that the court incorrectly interpreted the words “in relation to any property 
belonging to the company, or lawfully in its possession” as they appear in section 133(1) of the 
2008 Act, as the court interpreted these words in isolation.161 The learned author states that the 
court ought to have had regard to the full wording of the provision and included the words “ 
including enforcement action”.162 The author submits that enforcement action against a company 
in business rescue is barred by the general moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act, 
irrespective of whether the company is in lawful possession of the property or not, unless if the 
property owner obtains the consent of the business rescue practitioner or the court.163 Lawrenson 
then argues that the applicant in Kythera Court should have been obliged to obtain the consent of 
the court in bringing the eviction proceedings against the tenant company.164 This view of the 
learned author is agreed, because repossession of property falls under enforcement action as the 
property owner asserts his right to his property, usually after cancelling the agreement with the 
company, and enforcement actions, under a company in business rescue, are expressly prohibited 
the general moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act. It is also trite law that in order for the 
moratorium to be lifted- in this specific case- to bring proceedings for the ejectment of the first 
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respondent - the applicant should have made use of section 133(1)(b) and applied to court for leave 
to bring the proceedings.165 
5.2 Conclusion 
The moratorium as one of the most important consequences of the commencement of business 
rescue, provides the company with the necessary breathing space while the business rescue 
practitioner attempts to rescue the company and return it to a state of being financially viable.166 It 
is submitted that without the moratorium, it would be difficult to rescue a company. 
As discussed above, the moratorium, in relation to property belonging to the company or which is 
in the lawful possession of the company, prevents property owners from recovering their properties 
from a company under business rescue, due to the fact that such property may be vital to the 
rescuing of the company.167 The effect of preventing the property owner from repossessing its 
property, is that it allows the business rescue practitioner to attempt to rescue the company by 
devising a rescue plan that would enable the company to return to a state of being financially 
viable, without any harassment from the property owner.168 
The Kythera Court judgment and other judicial decisions, discussed above, illustrate how the 
courts have incorrectly interpreted the general moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 Act. It is 
submitted that the court’s interpretation of the general moratorium in section 133(1) of the 2008 
Act is not correct. The interpretation of the moratorium should not be one which will disregard the 
purpose of the moratorium and the objects of business rescue. 
The court in Kythera Court held that a property owner who cancels a lease agreement with a 
company in business rescue, is entitled to evict the company from the premises.169 This approach 
by the High Court is, with respect, flawed. This dissertation, through the discussion, has illustrated 
that the court in Kythera Court misapplied the general moratorium, by finding that a mere 
cancellation by the applicant entitled it to automatically repossess the leased premises from the 
tenant company under business rescue. The analysis by Cassim that, albeit the moratorium not 
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preventing a creditor from cancelling a contract with a company under business, the cancellation 
does not automatically entitle the lessor to repossess the leased property from the tenant company, 
is, in this dissertation, agreed.170 To apply the interpretation suggested by the court in Kythera 
Court would render the moratorium ineffective, as it would be easy for property owners to 
circumvent the moratorium, simply by cancelling the lease agreement and claiming repossession 
of the leased property. 
This dissertation has illustrated that the court in Kythera Court made an error in its analysis of the 
provisions of section 136(2)(a) of the 2008 Act, where the court held that, had the business rescue 
practitioner invoked the provisions of the section, the property owner would have been prevented 
from cancelling the lease agreement. The court failed to take cognisance of the fact that the 
business rescue practitioner, in terms of section 136(2) of the 2008 Act, is only entitled suspend 
the obligations of the company which would only become due after the commencement of business 
rescue. 
It is incomprehensible that the court would favour an interpretation that defeats the purpose of the 
business rescue as a whole. It is, with respect, disappointing for the court to allow a property owner 
to repossess premises which are vital to the business rescue process. It is common cause that in 
order for a company to return to a state of being financially viable, the company will have to 
continue conducting business and the ultimate question that was asked in this dissertation was, 
how can the first respondent, a restaurant, be expected to continue operating if it is deprived of the 
premises from which it conducts its business.  
It is the author’s view that judgment reached by the court in Kythera Court was flawed, using the 
words of Cassim, the court misconstrued the moratorium.171 The author submits that the court, 
when interpreting the provisions of the moratorium, ought to construe the moratorium in a manner 
that will have regard to the objects of the business rescue process as envisaged in section 
128(1)(b)(iii) of the 2008 Act. 
 
 
                                                          
170 Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner during business rescue” (n 3) 425. 
171 Cassim “The effect of the moratorium on property owner during business rescue” (n 3) 437. 
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